Chapter Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and Inner Speech by Wilkinson, Sam & Fernyhough, Charles
Sam Wilkinson 
and Charles Fernyhough 
Auditory Verbal 
Hallucinations 
and Inner Speech 
A Predictive Processing Perspective 
1. Introduction 
Inner speech is a pervasive feature of our conscious lives.1 But what is 
inner speech, and what happens in unconscious processing that makes 
it the conscious experience that it is? A clue to answering this can be 
found in cases where the mechanisms that produce inner speaking 
behave unusually. In this paper, we suggest an account of a specific 
instance of this, namely, a particular subtype of auditory verbal halluci-
nation (AVH), and draw some lessons about the processes that underlie 
normal inner speech. 
An AVH involves, roughly, the experience of hearing a voice in the 
absence of anyone actually speaking. As a phenomenon, it varies 
enormously in a number of ways: in how it presents itself phenomeno-
logically, in terms of the context in which it occurs, and arguably in 
what causes it. This has lead some theorists (Jones, 2010; Wilkinson, 
2014; Smailes et al., 2015) to claim that there are subtypes of AVHs, and 
that these amount to fundamentally different phenomena, underpinned 
by different mechanisms and different aetiologies. Three identified sub-
types are memory-based, inner speech-based and hypervigilance hallu-
cinations. As the names suggest, the ‘raw materials’ for memory and 
inner speech-based hallucinations are episodic memories and episodes 
of inner speech respectively. In contrast, hypervigilance hallucinations 
involve the moulding and boosting of ambiguous environmental 
stimuli into voices (as such, they are strictly speaking not so much 
                                                          
1  At least for most of us; for individual differences see Hurlburt et al. (2013). 
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hallucinations as illusions). Our focus in this paper is on inner speech-
based AVHs, and what they tell us about inner speech more generally.2 
It is worth mentioning that the order of explanatory primacy is 
normally the reverse of what we are doing here. Theorists tend to use 
inner speech (which they take to be relatively un-mysterious) to make 
sense of AVHs (which they take to be relatively mysterious) and not 
vice versa. However, it seems to us that, despite its prevalence and 
familiarity, the nature of inner speech is far from self-evident. Given 
this, it makes sense to start, for the sake of inquiry, with the hypothesis 
that at least some AVHs are instances of pathological inner speech, and 
then to ask: what kind of thing must inner speech be in order for it to 
play this role in the generation of AVHs? 
Before moving on, it is important for us to get clear on what kind of 
thing we are referring to by ‘inner speech’. By that term one can be 
referring either to a particular experience, with a particular phenomen-
ology, or to a particular feature of human cognition, which makes use 
of particular mechanisms, say, and which sometimes gives rise to that 
phenomenology, but which needn’t always (for example, when it is dis-
rupted in certain ways). In the former sense, the subtype of AVH that 
interests us is not an instance of inner speech, even though it may be 
generated by the processes that usually generate inner speech. In the 
latter sense, that subtype is, or is partly constituted by, an instance of 
inner speech. We will use the term ‘inner speech’ in the latter sense, 
although nothing of substance hangs on this terminological decision, 
and we acknowledge that both are valid senses of the term ‘inner 
speech’. 
2. A Predictive Processing Account 
of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations 
In this section, we present an account of AVH that is built within the 
predictive processing framework (PPF). Since this account arose in part 
as a reaction to self-monitoring accounts of AVHs, we begin by pre-
senting these accounts, and then move on to the predictive processing 
accounts. Then, in Section 3, we will explore the potential for predictive 
processing accounts of inner speech. 
                                                          
2  Some theorists don’t buy into subtypes, but if they adopt inner-speech based 
accounts across the board, then what we say will be of relevance to them. It is 
only those who think either that AVHs are homogeneous and nothing to do 
with inner speech, or who think that there are subtypes, but none of those sub-
types are inner speech-based who will take issue with our starting point. 
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2.1. Self-monitoring accounts of AVH 
Self-monitoring accounts are often viewed as unifying accounts of the 
positive symptoms of schizophrenia.3 Among these symptoms are 
delusions of control, AVHs, and thought insertion. What these symp-
toms all have in common is that they are instances of ‘self-monitoring’ 
having gone awry, which roughly means that a ‘self-produced’ or 
endogenous phenomenon fails to be recognized as such by the nervous 
system. These symptoms differ in so far as the phenomenon that is 
failing to be self-monitored differs. In AVHs and thought insertion, it is 
often taken to be inner speech. In delusions of control (and experiences 
of passivity) it is overt bodily action. 
So what is this ‘self-monitoring’? Perhaps the first theorist to make 
use of the idea of self-monitoring was Helmholtz (1866). He was not 
concerned with pathological cognition, but with healthy visual per-
ception. In particular, he wondered, when an image moves across the 
retina, how does our brain know whether it is the world moving across 
our eyes or our eyes moving across the world? He suggested that when 
our eyes move there is a motor command, and that a copy of that motor 
command, later called an ‘efference copy’, is used by the brain to calcu-
late a prediction of the sensory consequences of the upcoming eye 
movement. If this prediction is accurate and the predicted and actual 
sensory consequences match, then the brain ‘infers’ that the change was 
self-generated and the conscious percept is interpreted accordingly as a 
case of the eye moving across the world. We can experience for our-
selves what happens when there is no motor command, and hence no 
adjustment, when we move our eye directly with our finger: the world 
itself seems to move, namely, the brain ‘thinks’ it is the world moving 
across the eye rather than vice versa. 
These ideas were, much later, applied to psychosis (Feinberg, 1978). 
Although Feinberg’s initial paper was on ‘thought’ (which he took to 
involve motor mechanisms) and thought insertion, we introduce the 
self-monitoring account with delusions of control, since it is clear that, 
if anything involves motor commands, it is overt bodily actions. In 
delusions of control, a subject claims that somebody else is controlling 
her actions. Frith and Done (1989) claimed that here there is a mismatch 
between the predicted and actual sensory consequences of the bodily 
movement, with the result that (as with Helmholtz’s ocular example) 
the movement is attributed to an external source. In Helmholtz’s 
                                                          
3  Needless to say, in reporting these accounts we are remaining silent on the 
validity of the concept of schizophrenia. For the record, we have doubts that all 
of those who standardly get the diagnosis of schizophrenia suffer from the 
same unified condition. 
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example, the recognition by the nervous system that a certain stimulus 
is self-produced, due to this matching between the predicted and 
sensory consequences of movement, causes a correction of the con-
scious percept. In contrast, in more typical bodily motor control, this 
matching results in ‘sensory attenuation’, namely a decrease in the 
intensity of the sensation. In effect, when there is sensory attenuation, 
your nervous system is telling you: ‘You don’t need to pay attention to 
this: it’s only you.’ 
One striking datum that seems to support the hypothesis that some-
thing has gone wrong with this kind of self-monitoring in schizo-
phrenia is the reported finding that subjects with diagnoses of schizo-
phrenia can tickle themselves. The postulated explanation for this is 
that there is a mismatch between expected and actual sensory con-
sequences and the sensory consequences are not attenuated: the 
tickling sensation is like being tickled by somebody else (Frith, 
Blakemore and Wolpert, 2000). 
Several theorists (Feinberg, 1978; Frith, 1992; Jones and Fernyhough, 
2007; Seal et al., 2004) have attempted to explain AVHs in terms of these 
same self-monitoring abnormalities operating on inner speech. On 
these accounts, AVHs are instances of badly monitored, and hence un-
attenuated and externally attributed, inner speech. 
2.2. Problems for the self-monitoring account of AVH 
What is wrong with the self-monitoring account of AVH? As Wilkinson 
(2014) points out, there are potentially problems in accounting for (i) 
the phenomenology of AVH, and (ii) their variety. The first of these is 
effectively the issue of how we explain the transformation, in phenom-
enology, from inner speech to AVHs. The second of these concerns the 
issue of accounting for the wide varieties in AVHs with one model. 
This second worry can be overcome simply by saying that only some 
AVHs are misattributed episodes of inner speech arising from self-
monitoring abnormalities. This kind of strategy seems like a sensible 
move regardless of what explanatory model you are trying to promote: 
AVHs are varied in how they present, in their contexts of occurrence, 
and in their apparent causes. Whether the first worry can be overcome 
is still a matter of debate (see, e.g. Cho and Wu’s, 2013, attack on inner 
speech-based approaches and Moseley and Wilkinson’s, 2014, defence), 
but it seems that acknowledging, on the one hand, the complexity and 
variety of inner speech phenomenology (McCarthy-Jones and 
Fernyhough, 2011), and the effect of the postulated lack of ‘attenuation’ 
resulting from failed self-monitoring, may go some way towards 
answering this worry. 
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Another worry may not come from whether the phenomenon to be 
explained (AVH) seems to fit the account, but rather from the viability 
of the very idea of monitoring inner speech (regardless of what 
phenomenon a deficit of such monitoring might generate). First of all, it 
is not obvious that inner speech involves motoric elements, and, so, 
where is the motor command that self-monitoring is supposed to 
exploit? This concern can be addressed, however. Motoric involvement 
in some forms of inner speech has been empirically supported by 
electromyographical (EMG) studies, some of which date as far back as 
the early 1930s (e.g. Jacobsen, 1931). Furthermore, later experiments 
made the connection between inner speech and AVH, showing that 
similar muscular activation is involved in healthy inner speech and 
AVH (Gould, 1948; McGuigan, 1966). 
However, demonstrating motoric involvement in both inner speech 
and (at least some) AVHs doesn’t let the self-monitoring theorist off the 
hook. It is not just motor commands that are important for self-
monitoring, it is also the predicted and actual sensory consequence of 
the monitored phenomenon, and the match or discrepancy between the 
two. But what are the sensory consequences of inner speech? Is inner 
speech sensory at all? If so, where is the stimulus? Furthermore, since it 
doesn’t occur in three-dimensional space, does it even need monitoring? 
These questions point towards a more fundamental worry, namely that 
the self-monitoring mechanism is not actually very well understood at 
the neural level. In a related manner, the postulated self-monitoring 
mechanism seems to be little more than a re-description of the compu-
tational task that any active system would need to do in order to 
distinguish what it does from what is done to it. In contrast, predictive 
processing accounts start from a general theory of what the brain does, 
and how this is implemented at the neural level (Friston, 2005). It then 
turns out that the self-monitoring task that needs to be achieved falls 
naturally out of this (along with many other tasks besides, e.g. making 
sense of noisy and ambiguous perceptual inputs). 
Indeed, perhaps the main problem with the self-monitoring account 
actually has less to do with the account itself, and more to do with the 
overall framework within which the account operates, namely, how 
cognition generally is taken to work, how the brain processes informa-
tion from the outside world and how that relates to conscious experi-
ence. Self-monitoring accounts try to explain, within a standard frame-
work for understanding cognition, why someone is having an experi-
ence that usually occurs with a particular environmental stimulus (i.e. a 
speech sound), in the absence of that stimulus. The answer that the self-
monitoring account gives is that there is a stimulus of sorts, it just 
hasn’t been recognized by the nervous system (it may be so recognized 
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by the person, as when a voice-hearer says ‘I know it’s just my brain’) as 
a self-produced stimulus. That stimulus is inner speech. But what if this 
approach is doubly wrong? What if cognition generally, and healthy 
perceptual cognition, isn’t really about the external stimulus in this 
way? And what if inner speech, more specifically, isn’t about, and 
couldn’t be counted as, a stimulus either? We present a general frame-
work, and an account of AVH within it, that pursues precisely this line 
of questioning. 
2.3. From self-monitoring to predictive processing 
Some theorists (some of whom were, earlier, the main proponents of 
the self-monitoring account; compare Frith, 1992, with Fletcher and 
Frith, 2009) have proposed that the self-monitoring that is taken to go 
awry in AVH falls naturally out of a basic principle of brain function, 
namely, prediction error minimization. On this account, self-monitoring is 
not some additional aspect of cognition, but is a fundamental part of it 
(see Pickering and Clark, 2014). One upshot of this is that all of the 
varieties of AVHs can be accounted for (see Wilkinson, 2014), including 
those that may not involve motor commands from which forward 
models could be derived. For example, they can account for the ‘hyper-
vigilance’ hallucinations (Dodgson and Gordon, 2009) we briefly men-
tioned in the introduction, in which environmental stimuli are boosted 
and shaped. This framework for thinking about cognition, and within 
which self-monitoring emerges from the basic functioning of cognition, 
is called the predictive processing framework (PPF).4 
According to the PPF, the brain’s main task is to ‘infer’ from 
incoming signals what the causes of those signals are. However, the 
incoming signal underdetermines distal causes: since inputs are noisy 
and ambiguous, the same stimulation can be brought about by two 
different distal causes (and different stimulation in different circum-
stances can be caused by the same distal cause). Given that more than 
one hypothesis is compatible with the incoming signal, the brain needs 
to take two things into account: first, the fit of the input with the 
hypothesis, and, second, how statistically likely that hypothesis is (the 
‘prior probability’). A hypothesis could fit the input extremely well, but 
its prior probability could be so low that it isn’t even considered. 
Conversely, an hypothesis could have such a high prior probability, 
that, even though it doesn’t fit the input well, it is settled upon.5 
                                                          
4  For a fuller presentation of the PPF, see Clark (2013). 
5  A nice example of this is the Hollow Mask Illusion. When you are presented 
with the concave back of a mask, your brain ‘corrects’ the concave stimulus into 
a convex stimulus. This is due to the fact that the hypothesis ‘convex face’ (i.e. 
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What the selection of an hypothesis does is that it determines a set 
of predictions about subsequent inputs, namely, inputs that are com-
patible with the hypothesis. If the hypothesis does a good job of pre-
dicting inputs, it is kept. If it does a bad job, it is tweaked or abandoned 
altogether in favour of another hypothesis that does a better job. In 
other words, one hypothesis is selected rather than another if it better 
minimizes prediction error. 
This picture has interesting consequences for how we are to view 
the role of input on sensory receptors and its impact on higher cortical 
regions, and also on conscious experience. According to the PPF, the 
only information that gets passed on up the cortical hierarchy is pre-
diction error. This stands in sharp contrast to the standard view of 
perception and cognition according to which inputs come in, are pro-
cessed, and passed on. According to the PPF, what determines your 
perceptual experience is what your brain has already predicted, your 
brain’s best hypothesis. 
This prediction error minimization is not only taken to account for 
perception and cognition, but for action as well (see, e.g. Adams et al., 
2013). Instead of there being motor commands, as on the standard 
picture, what you have are predictions, which are then fulfilled by the 
subsequent bodily movement, thereby also being a case of prediction 
error minimization. This is often called ‘active inference’, which 
Pickering and Clark (2014) helpfully gloss as follows: ‘the combined 
mechanism by which perceptual and motor systems conspire to reduce 
prediction error using the twin strategies of altering predictions to fit 
the world and altering the world (including the body) to fit the pre-
dictions’ (p. 1). 
Another extremely important aspect of the PPF is that the 
hypotheses are hierarchically organized, with the hypotheses of one 
level providing the inputs for the next. ‘Hypotheses’ can also be talked 
about in a very ‘zoomed out’ way, to talk about the overall hypothesis, 
or in a very ‘zoomed in’ way, to talk about ‘hypotheses’ in early stages 
of perceptual processing. ‘Higher’ parts of the hierarchy are, roughly, 
those parts that are further away from the sensory stimulus. These tend 
to be at longer temporal timescales, and a higher level of abstraction. 
They might correspond, for example, to the belief that lions are 
dangerous. ‘Lower’ parts of the hierarchy are closer to the sensory 
stimulus. These tend to be operating at shorter timescales, and at low 
                                                                                                                               
normal face) has a very strong prior probability and that overrides the better fit 
that the ‘concave face’ hypothesis has with the incoming signal. This prior 
probability is generated by the expectation that the faces you will encounter 
will always be convex. 
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levels of abstraction. These, for example, might correspond to early 
stages of perceptual processing: your brain’s early statistically-driven 
attempts to make sense of noisy inputs (see, for example, Gangepain et 
al., 2012, for strong evidence for predictive processing in auditory word 
recognition). Of course, in order to express these neurally encoded pre-
dictions we need to use rough-and-ready descriptions in natural 
language (in this case English), but there is nothing linguistic about the 
priors/hypotheses (‘light comes from above’/‘This is a face’) 
themselves. 
Let’s take an example (adapted from Pezzulo, 2014) to illustrate the 
predictive hierarchy. Suppose that, on the basis of a noise, which you 
take to be a squeaking window, two hypotheses present themselves 
about what is going on: either the wind blew the window, or a thief is 
clambering into your house. At the stage where those two hypotheses 
are competing, a great deal of ambiguity has already been resolved at 
lower levels of the hierarchy. For example, in early stages of auditory 
processing, the qualities of the sound will have been settled upon, 
giving rise to the conscious experience being a certain way, qualita-
tively speaking. Higher up the hierarchy, that sound gets interpreted as 
a creaking window, as opposed to something else. The direction of 
causation is from the (events represented in the) lower regions of the 
hierarchy to the (events represented in the) higher regions of the 
hierarchy. However, the direction of the inference is from the effects to 
the causes. 
One final way in which the framework is made a bit more complex 
is that, in order to accurately form predictions in a world where the 
degree of noise varies from context to context, the brain needs also to 
predict the extent to which it can rely on its predictions. In other words, 
it needs to form second-order predictions, or estimate the precision of 
its predictions. In the predictive processing literature, this is called 
‘precision-weighting’, and it amounts to the extent to which prediction 
error, once generated, is given weight. In contexts of high noise (e.g. in 
a dark room), the precision-weighting on bottom-up sensory prediction 
error will be low, and more influence will be placed on top-down influ-
ences. That is why at dusk you are more likely to see a tree trunk as a 
lurking aggressor. 
2.4. The PPF and hallucinations 
The PPF changes how one thinks of perceptual experience, and, by 
extension, radically changes one’s explanatory focus in trying to 
account for hallucinations. On a standard framework, where front-line 
sensory stimuli get gradually processed and passed on up the 
hierarchy, hallucinations make one wonder, ‘Where does this 
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erroneous sensory stimulus come from?’ As mentioned, we can see self-
monitoring accounts as making attempts to answer this within a 
standard framework. Their answer is: they come from the quasi-
sensory stimulation of inner speech, which is then misattributed. 
However, when instead we adopt the PPF, incoming stimuli play a 
much smaller role in determining the conscious percept, even where 
veridical perception is concerned. Given that a conscious percept is 
constituted by the hypothesis that best minimizes prediction error, we 
don’t ask ‘Where does the input come from?’, since the input alone 
doesn’t (and can’t) determine the percept. Rather we ask, ‘Why does 
this hypothesis minimize prediction error?’ This general approach 
makes hallucinations both less perplexing, and less different from 
veridical perception. 
Wilkinson (2014) has suggested at least three different ways in 
which the hypothesis corresponding to an AVH experience may be 
selected. These correspond to the three phenomenologically and aetiol-
ogically identifiable subtypes mentioned at the outset: inner speech-
based, memory-based, and hypervigilance hallucinations. Both inner 
speech- and memory-based hallucinations are taken to be the result of 
aberrant weighting on prediction error. In other words, the self-
generated hypotheses corresponding to inner speech and episodic 
memory turn out to generate unexpected levels of prediction error, 
which results in perception-like hypotheses being selected in an 
attempt to minimize this. This leads to a ‘perceptualization’ of the usual 
experiences of inner speech and episodic memory. In contrast, hyper-
vigilance hallucinations are explained in terms of interroceptive pre-
dictive processing (Seth, 2013), where the hypothesis is selected not 
only based on how well it explains the incoming signal, but on how 
well it explains both the incoming signal and the subject’s interro-
ceptive emotional state. Thus the hypothesis that someone is insulting 
me explains not just a vague environmental stimulus, but also my state 
of anxiety and hypervigilance (see Wilkinson, 2014, for more details 
here). 
In Wilkinson (2014), the more original contribution was taken to be 
the interroceptive account of hypervigilance hallucinations, with 
existing inner speech (Jones and Fernyhough, 2007) and memory-based 
(Badcock et al., 2005) accounts merely requiring a slight reframing, from 
self-monitoring to predictive processing. However, such a reframing is 
not obviously achieved for either the inner speech or memory subtype, 
largely because it is not obvious how the PPF accounts for inner speech 
and episodic memory. In this chapter, we focus on inner speech, 
although an important area of future theorizing would involve an 
explanation of how the PPF accounts for episodic recollections. 
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3. A Predictive Processing 
Account of Inner Speech 
It’s all very well saying that AVHs are the result of changes to pre-
dictive processing, and that a subtype of AVH involves the mecha-
nisms that are involved in inner speech. But what are the mechanisms 
involved in standard inner speech? In other words, what does a pre-
dictive processing account of inner speech look like? 
3.1. Inner speech as ‘internalized’ outer speech 
Before asking ourselves what the PPF makes of a given phenomenon, 
we need to be clear that we have successfully identified the phenom-
enon in question. So, what is inner speech, how does it develop, and 
what purpose does it serve? One very attractive theory, attributed to 
Lev Vygotsky, which carries both evolutionary and developmental 
plausibility, is that inner speech starts off as speech, namely, ‘overt 
speech’. That is to say, whatever function inner speech plays, once it 
has developed, is played by overt speech in children who have not yet 
developed the capacity to engage in inner speech. This capacity to 
engage in inner speech is usually seen to involve, at least in part, the 
capacity to inhibit the overt production of speech (see Alderson-Day 
and Fernyhough, 2015, for a comprehensive review on the psychology 
and neuroscience of inner speech). 
According to this story, inner speech is the end product of a 
developmental trajectory that begins with social speech, between an 
infant and primary caregiver, and then becomes overt private speech, 
before finally becoming inner speech. ‘Private speech’ refers to speech 
that is not produced for the benefit of anyone other than the speaker. 
Thus, although there is an important sense in which inner speech is 
always de facto private speech, pragmatics dictates that ‘private speech’ 
tends to refer to overt private speech, rather than inner speech (since 
inner speech is obviously private). Young children will first, under the 
guidance of a caregiver, learn to reason verbally, but out loud, for the 
benefit of guiding their thinking and attention. Over time, they learn to 
‘internalize’ this speech, or, to phrase it in somewhat less misleading 
terms, to inhibit its overt production. However, as with many cases of 
motoric inhibition, vestiges of the motor processes often remain (as 
clearly seen in Jacobsen, 1931). Furthermore, the reason why an 
auditory phenomenology is often reported is quite simply because, as 
with any aborted overt action (motor imagery), the predictions of the 
sensory consequences of the action come into play, activating sensory 
(and somatosensory) cortices (this is central to feedback, which is 
crucial for all successful motoric activity). 
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3.2. Inner speaking and auditory imagery 
What is going on when someone is engaged in inner speech? What 
constitutes inner speech? It is tempting to think of inner speech in 
terms of auditory imagery. Engaging in inner speech, on such a view, 
consists in imagining the sound of you speaking (or imagining hearing 
yourself speak). There is little doubt that one can imagine the sound of 
oneself speaking. It is like imagining hearing someone else speak, 
except that it has the properties of your voice. This, however, is not 
what inner speech, the phenomenon of primary interest to us, is. As 
we’ve seen, inner speech involves not just an auditory/imagistic com-
ponent, but an articulatory/motoric component, too. Inner speech is 
agentive and more or less intentional (Jones and Fernyhough, 2007). To 
the extent that it is correct to speak of inner speech in terms of imagina-
tion at all, it does not consist in imagining hearing one’s voice: it is the 
phenomenon of imagining oneself speaking (see Hurlburt, Heavey and 
Kelsey, 2013, for a phenomenological distinction between ‘inner 
speaking’ and ‘inner hearing’). In any case, it seems misleading to 
speak of inner speech in terms of imagination, and here is why. 
It is crucially important to differentiate imagination from imagery. 
Imagination is a personal-level phenomenon: people are engaged in 
acts of imagination. These acts of imagination enable them to appre-
ciate, in potentially many different ways, non-actual scenarios, and, 
when they are engaged in such acts, they may be motivated to do so by 
a number of different things. They may be trying to remember the 
colour of someone’s hair, judge whether they could have jumped over 
that river, reason about a social situation, or simply engage in imagina-
tion for the pleasure of it. These acts of imagination often will recruit or 
make use of imagery in many modalities, but there will also be aspects 
to the imaginative experience that aren’t imagistic. 
Imagery, in contrast, is not a personal-level event. Whereas people 
imagine things, people don’t do imagery. When people imagine things, 
imagery may be involved. Imagery is also involved in personal-level 
events that aren’t imaginings. For example, imagery may be involved 
in inner speech, indeed it may even be similar (or even the same 
imagery) to the imagery involved in imagined speech, but that doesn’t 
make the personal-level act of inner speaking an act of imagining 
speaking. For a start, with inner speaking, you are not appreciating 
something non-actual: it is actual. You are speaking. 
 In short, it is important to understand the relationship between 
auditory imagery and inner speech, and, in a related manner, to under-
stand that inner speech is not, in virtue of its recruitment of auditory 
imagery, simply a kind of imagined speech. Two things underpin this; 
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one is more sophisticated than the other. On the one hand, inner speech 
involves not just (and sometimes perhaps not even) auditory imagery, 
but motoric/articulatory imagery as well. In principle, however, there 
could be imagined speaking that made use of both motoric and 
auditory imagery, and this leads us on to the second more sophisti-
cated reason why inner speech isn’t imagined speech. Inner speech 
involves making a speech act, involves speaking your mind directly. 
The fact that someone is engaging in inner speech entails that they are 
speaking. The fact that someone in engaged in imagining themselves 
speak not only fails to entail that they are speaking, it actively entails 
that they are not speaking, since they are merely imagining it! 
If we are to provide an account of inner speech, we need not only to 
account for the sensory and motoric imagery that are standardly part of 
acts of inner speech, but which can also potentially be part of other acts 
too, but also to account for what distinguishes inner speech from those 
other acts that make use of similar imagery. 
3.3. Motoric and sensory imagery within the PPF 
The PPF can very nicely accommodate the aspects of sensory and 
motoric imagery that are standardly part of inner speech. According to 
the PPF, all the brain ever does is minimize prediction error. As we’ve 
seen, this is taken to account for both perception and action. Whereas in 
perception hypotheses are selected to generate accurate predictions 
about the world, thereby minimizing prediction error, in action, 
predictions are generated which are then to be fulfilled by the action, 
thereby also minimizing prediction error. As a result, the notion of 
motor commands, at least as a type of neural activity in their own right, 
is dispensed with (we could, of course, still call the predictions that 
bring about actions motor commands—they do, after all, serve pre-
cisely that function). 
Now, this presents us with an account of ‘imagery’ for both motoric 
and sensory domains. Although they are very different, they operate on 
exactly the same principles, namely, inhibition at a neural level, which 
within the PPF amounts to down-modulating the weighting/precision 
of prediction error. This turning down of the gain allows for a 
decoupling of the brain from the world. It is a way of minimizing 
prediction error without having to actually match the world (a rela-
tively costly and difficult way, which is why it takes a while for 
children to master it, and why it is interfered with under conditions of 
cognitive load). And that is partly, and by definition, what imagery (as 
opposed to perception) is: something that represents something non-
actual. It is a percept or action that isn’t actually happening. 
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How does this relate to self-monitoring accounts? Imagery, both 
motoric and sensory (of which inner speech is composed), is not a self-
produced stimulus in need of monitoring. There are no predicted and 
actual sensory consequences of imagery, where the latter can diverge 
from the former (as is the case with overt bodily action). Rather, the 
imagery, like any part of conscious experience, is the prediction itself, or, 
more specifically, a decoupled hypothesis that entails a bunch of 
deliberately unfulfilled (but prediction-error-minimized, through 
down-modulation) predictions. 
A point of clarification is needed at this point. In this subsection, we 
have said nothing about inner speech per se. We have simply explained 
how sensory and motoric imagery, both of which seem to be involved 
in inner speech (as well as many other events besides), are to be viewed 
within the PPF. What does PPF have to say about inner speech more 
specifically? 
3.4. A predictive processing account of inner speech 
As we’ve said, an episode of inner speech (or, perhaps better, an act of 
inner speaking) is not an imaginative act. It is not imagining yourself 
speaking, indeed, it is not imagining anything: it is speaking. But just 
like overt speaking involves moving your mouth, throat, etc. as well as 
hearing yourself speak, so does inner speaking, at least often, involve 
the decoupled versions of these. This amounts to saying that inner 
speaking makes use of auditory and motoric imagery. So much we’ve 
already said. But what makes something an act of inner speaking as 
opposed to an act of imagined speech is that part of my experience is 
not only the low-level decoupled hypotheses that determine my 
imagery (both sensory and motoric), but high-level hypotheses about 
myself as an agent. Indeed there is a similar distinction when someone 
else is speaking to me, in a normal overt case, between my low-level 
hypotheses about sounds (or slightly higher up, phonemes, or higher 
up still, words, etc.) and my high-level hypotheses about the agent, 
their intentions, whether these speech sounds constitute a sincere 
speech act, and, if so, what kind of speech act, and what is the precise 
communicated content, etc. In inner speech we have all of these 
hypotheses about ourselves, as we are engaged in inner speech, and, 
what’s more, they are almost always accurate. Verbally reprimanding 
myself in inner speech involves (i) me actually verbally reprimanding 
myself and (ii) in so far as I experience that reprimand, my brain 
having an hypothesis, not just about the words (or phonemes, etc.) 
used in the reprimand, but about the fact that I am reprimanding 
myself (which is clearly accurate in this case). 
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4. Consequences of a Predictive Processing 
Account of Inner Speech 
A predictive processing account of inner speech has a number of inter-
esting consequences. Some of these consequences are shared by com-
patible but higher-level or developmental accounts, such as Vygotskian 
accounts. Others are specific to the PPF and the hierarchical arrange-
ment of hypotheses. 
4.1. Epistemic consequences 
The predictive processing account of inner speech fits nicely with the 
Vygotskian developmental story, at least in part because they make 
inner speech and outer speech very similar phenomena. However, this 
proximity between the inner and outer phenomenon raises an interest-
ing epistemological issue, and it is as follows. 
We very often talk to others in order to inform them, either directly 
or indirectly, of certain things, including states of the world, and our 
own states of mind. Granted, not all speech acts are informational: they 
can be imperative, expressive, etc. and the same applies to inner 
speech. However, in the cases where inner speech is informational, 
what motivates such speech acts? Why would I bother talking to myself 
if I already know what I’m going to say? One obvious way out of this 
problem is to insist that, contrary to our intuitions, we don’t really 
know what we are going to say. Hence our utterances, in inner or outer 
speech, do not presuppose self-knowledge: they often generate it. This 
conclusion, though arrived at through logical argument, fits extremely 
well with the PPF. Within the PPF, there is no in-built provision for an 
introspective mechanism; there is simply the experience of certain per-
cepts, actions, and emotions which all have the potential to feed into 
higher-level hypotheses I might have about myself. 
A related upshot of this is that thinking is in some sense always 
dialogic. According to the PPF, simple, world-directed cognition 
involves coming up with accurate hypotheses about the world in the 
service of the organism’s goals. ‘Thinking’ (among this woolly notion 
we include reasoning, supposing, wondering) emerges when the 
organism can decouple itself from the world in the service of goals 
represented in absentia. This involves the generation of things that stand 
as proxies for the absent (because they are future or distant or abstract) 
aspects of the world. Speech is a particularly helpful phenomenon that 
helps us do this (there are likely others), either overtly (‘thinking 
aloud’, a phenomenon that literally happens) or in inner speech. In 
these situations, we are both producers and recipients, and, as such, we 
are in a constant and inescapable dialogue with ourselves. This, 
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coupled with the earlier anti-introspectionist epistemological con-
sequence, may even suggest that this dialogicality (although it may not 
always use the medium of speech) is central to the robust self-awareness 
that humans are capable of. 
4.2. The self and other in inner speech 
At some relevant level of abstraction, it is clear that we represent other 
agents, when, among other things, we see them, think about them, hear 
them talk, etc. Within the PPF, this would correspond to hypotheses at 
a relevant level in the predictive processing hierarchy (generative 
models). When someone talks to us, we represent them (we retrieve a 
previous representation if it’s someone we know already, or we use a 
generic model if it’s someone new). It also seems that, in inner speech, 
we at some level represent ourselves at least implicitly. Now, there is 
one feature of AVHs, inserted thoughts, and cases of delusions of 
control that seems somewhat problematic for self-monitoring accounts, 
and it is that the subject doesn’t simply claim to be passive in the face of 
these thoughts, utterances, and actions, but gets a sense that they are 
the responsibility of another, often quite richly represented, agent (see 
Wilkinson and Bell, 2015, for a focus on the representation of specific 
agents in AVHs). This is problematic for the self-monitoring account, 
because this account only tells us that the subjects ought to experience 
this as ‘not me’. However, they do not explain the move from ‘not me’ 
to ‘someone else’. Of course, these theorists could say that this is 
merely an abductive inference based on the feeling of ‘not me’ (‘My 
actions or inner speech don’t feel like me. How do I explain that? It 
must be someone else’). 
We note that this inferential step is an under-acknowledged feature 
of inner-speech models of AVHs. Two retorts to this inferential tactic 
are that, first, it doesn’t explain why that is the explanatory inference so 
often resorted to (one would expect others), and, second, it wouldn’t 
seem like a very good hypothesis to adopt. The hypotheses that other 
people can control your actions or insert thoughts into your head, or 
talk to you in their physical absence, ought to be assigned a pretty low 
probability compared to, say, the explanatory hypothesis that some-
thing is wrong with your nervous system. 
What if there is a more straightforward story to be told about how 
the move is made from ‘not me’ to ‘someone else’? The PPF may have 
the resources to do just that. From birth we learn about the world as 
our nervous systems become sensitive to statistical regularities, and 
this is manifested in hierarchically arranged hypotheses and expecta-
tions. Two very different kinds of stimuli, about which a (even 
moderately) developed human being’s nervous system will have a host 
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of different kinds of expectations, are inanimate objects, and animate 
objects (namely, agents). The expectations our nervous systems have 
about inanimate objects embody our naïve physics, so to speak, the 
expectation about agents, our naïve psychology (e.g. Spelke, 2000). Now, 
if a phenomenon exhibits basic statistical characteristics that activate 
our naïve psychology, this will be experienced as the work of an agent, 
and in a way that the subject may find very hard to override. 
This may account for why agency, in a generic sense, is attributed, 
but as for why it is often specific agents, the answer may be as follows. 
Our nervous systems have expectations about types of thing. It, how-
ever, also makes sense that it should have expectations about—repre-
sentations of—specific individuals (including oneself). Some of these 
individuals may be particularly salient as a result of the subject’s past, 
or may be constructed and attached to a particular statistical pattern 
that is recurrently present in the experience. This idea amounts to a sort 
of merging of theories of agent tracking (see Bullot, 2009) and pre-
dictive processing. We see no reason to think that these two theories 
aren’t compatible; indeed, the agent representation that is used in 
tracking could be viewed within the PPF as a generative model for that 
specific individual.6 
Such agent-specific generative models won’t only have utility in 
interacting with others (verbally, visually, etc.) but also in live inter-
actions with oneself, where a generative model of oneself will be active 
and liable to being updated or diverged from. This would occur in 
inner speech, among other contexts (and may contribute to fleshing out 
just what is meant by a misattribution of inner speech, and the different 
ways in which it can be incurred). Furthermore, such generative 
models needn’t be restricted to live interactions, but would come into 
play in simulated interactions with others (and indeed oneself). This 
would also encompass cases of dialogic inner speech where other indi-
viduals are represented (see McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough, 2011). 
4.3. Soundless voices 
One important feature of the PPF is that hypotheses are hierarchically 
arranged in terms of how concrete and fine-grained they are. Thus, 
when we perceive things visually or auditorily, our brains are adopting 
                                                          
6  Future avenues for research could tie the disruptions of these agent-specific 
generative models to delusional misidentification, where people claim that the 
misidentified person looks the same, but is somehow different. This ineffable 
difference may be due to changes to expectations about that person, which the 
person is no longer fulfilling (and hence there is a generation of prediction 
error). 
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hypotheses about specific colours and sounds, as well as higher-level 
hypotheses about, say, tables and chairs (in the visual case) and, say, 
melodies (in the auditory case). It is plausible to think that there are 
special intermediary hypotheses involved in linguistic cognition that 
correspond to specialized areas of linguistic expertise, from phonology, 
lexicon, grammar, all the way up to the literal and intended meanings 
of whole utterances. In perception, the low-level hypotheses tend to 
ground the higher-level ones: you experience a particular sentence 
because you experience particular words, which in turn you experi-
enced because you experienced particular phonemes, and particular 
phonemes because particular sounds. Of course, the extraction of these 
is driven by top-down expectations, as the PPF would suggest. How-
ever, the high-level hypotheses tend not to be active in the absence of 
lower level ones: you don’t auditorily perceive words in the absence of 
perceiving sounds. Things are somewhat different in imagination and 
in ‘thought’. The higher-level hypotheses are activated with degraded 
or absent sensory hypotheses. That’s arguably what more or less 
‘abstract thinking’ is. 
But what if something has the externality of a perceptual experience, 
but has the informational quality of one of these more ‘abstract’ 
episodes? That is precisely what we seem to get in the (not especially 
rare) cases of ‘hearing soundless voices’. Higher-level hypotheses are 
activated, with an unusual perception-like vivacity, in the absence of 
lower-level ones. This would yield an unfamiliar sort of perception-like 
experience, in the absence of sensory qualities. Here is a self-report of 
such an experience: 
It’s hard to describe how I could ‘hear’ a voice that wasn’t auditory; but 
the words the voices used and the emotions they contained (hatred and 
disgust) were completely clear, distinct, and unmistakable, maybe even 
more so than if I had heard them aurally. (Woods et al., 2015, p. 326) 
This idea of higher-level hypotheses being active in the absence of 
those lower level ones that usually accompany them is in keeping with 
work examining the idea that the experience of communication may be 
at the heart of AVHs. In particular the idea is that sometimes what is 
experienced is the communicative intention, e.g. the intention to insult, 
which may or may not bring about an accompanying sensory auditory 
phenomenology (Deamer and Wilkinson, 2014). In principle, the PPF 
allows for the separation of the levels of the hierarchy, since the pre-
cision can be turned down at any point in the hierarchy, leading to one 
level no longer being answerable to the other (which is the same 
principle as decoupling from the world, but occurs within the nervous 
system itself). 
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5. Recap and Conclusion 
What have we learnt about inner speech? Well, what inner speech 
fundamentally is, when viewed through the lens of the PPF, is the 
generation by my brain of a decoupled hypothesis that I am speaking 
(which I am doing for my own cognitive benefit). When I am speaking 
out loud, there are motoric and proprioceptive elements, and there are 
also auditory elements. Similarly, when I am engaged in inner speech 
there is both auditory and motoric imagery (predictions which are 
united under the same hypothesis—namely, that I am speaking to 
myself, or at least for my own benefit). How accurate is the hypothesis? 
Well, the hypothesis is multi-layered: there are low-level, decoupled 
predictions about auditory and proprioceptive stimulation, which, in a 
sense, are inaccurate, but unproblematically so, since they are 
deliberately decoupled. They are cases of imagery, not perception. 
There are also high-level predictions about my own agency and 
communicative intentions, and these are in an important sense not 
decoupled. But in a similar vein, they are also, at least usually, accurate: 
I am speaking, performing speech acts, when I experience my healthy, 
ecologically valid, inner speech. This combination, within a unified 
hypothesis, of coupled and decoupled predictions, this hybrid of 
imagination and self-perception, means that inner speech involves a 
delicate balance. The high-level hypothesis that this is me, and that I am 
saying this, is liable to be discarded in favour of another hypothesis 
(this is someone else, and they are saying something else), if there are 
disruptions to either aspects of the lower-level sensory and proprio-
ceptive decoupled predictions, or to aspects of more high-level pre-
dictions. In particular, these predictions may remain de facto decoupled, 
but not recognized as such by the experiencing subject. This involves a 
perceptualization of imagery: a percept with perception-like vivacity, 
but which isn’t answerable to what’s happening in the world. 
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